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Industrial policy is back in fashion, and rightly so.
There is now an understanding that markets by themselves may not lead
to economic efficiency—let alone a desirable distribution of income. The
market may not lead to either a good allocation of resources among sectors
or the appropriate choice of techniques. Industrial policies, aimed at affecting
the economy’s sectoral allocation and/or choice of technique, are one of the
instruments for addressing these market failures. Appropriately designed gov-
ernment policies can lead to better outcomes. While this is true even for
developed countries, it is perhaps particularly true for developing countries,
and this is so even if developing countries have less developed governmental
institutions. Limitations on the capacity of government should affect the
choice of instruments for carrying out industrial policies, but not whether
they should undertake industrial policies.
While there is renewed interest in industrial policies,1 recent discussions are
markedly different from those that characterized an earlier era in our under-
standing of both the objectives and the instruments of industrial policy. There
are broader objectives and more instruments, to echo a more general theme
I put forward in criticism of Washington Consensus policies (Stiglitz 1999).
For instance, the government plays a central role in shaping the economy, not
1 Evidenced, for instance, by the emphasis placed on industrial policies by the previous chief
economist of the World Bank, Lin (2012). While I have long had an interest in industrial policies,
my more recent engagement began with joint work with Bruce Greenwald (Greenwald and Stiglitz
2006, 2014a, 2014b; Stiglitz and Greenwald 2014a, 2014b). See also Stiglitz and Lin (2014) and
Stiglitz, Lin, and Patel (2014).
only through formal industrial policies and in its expenditure and tax policies,
but in writing the rules of the game—markets do not exist in a vacuum, and
the way that the government structures markets inevitably affects economic
structure (Stiglitz 2015). In that sense, every country has an industrial policy
but some countries do not know it. And that opens the possibility that the
structure of the economy is set, or at least greatly influenced, by special
interests. Such an economy is likely to be beset by rent seeking and the
resulting pervasive inefficiencies, and the economy will be characterized by
lower growth and more inequality than would be the case if the government
were more self-consciousness in their direction of the economy.
Financial market deregulation illustrates this: it was actually an agenda
pushed by those in the financial sector to increase its size. It was an industrial
policy, but one that led to lower growth and more inequality and instability.
A traditional criticism of industrial policies is related to ‘political economy’,
that such policies are likely to be captured by special interests to advance
themselves. However, the previous paragraphs highlighted that not having
an industrial policy—leaving it to the market, structured as it so often is by
special interests—is itself a special-interest agenda. To avoid capture by special
interests theremust be openness, transparency, and a deeper understanding of
the rationale for industrial policies. Some countries have developed institu-
tional arrangements and cultures that have made it more likely that industrial
policies will work and less likely that there will be corruption in their
implementation.
I need to make four more preliminary remarks:
(1) Industrial policies, as I use the term, are not necessarily aimed at pro-
moting industrialization. The term embraces any policy affecting the sectoral
composition of the economy or the choice of technology. Thus, industrial
policy in this sense should also be part of corporate governance, anti-trust and
competition policy, and monetary policy and bankruptcy frameworks, as well
as (more obviously) tax and expenditure policy.
(2) The success of industrial policy is not to be judged by the success or
failure of any individual project, but rather has to be evaluated systematically
(i.e., on how the performance of the overall economy is affected). At the centre
of our analysis is learning and the creation of new institutions, with benefits to
those outside the particular project or sectors under scrutiny. That is why
Greenwald and I titled our recent book Creating a Learning Society (2014a,
2014b). We were concerned with impacts and learning processes, which
even went beyond the economy. We made a case for an ‘infant economy’
argument for protection, which was distinctly different from an ‘infant indus-
try’ argument. Our earlier paper (2006) on the subject was titled ‘Helping
Infant Economies Grow’. In this sense, our work follows on the earlier work
of Hirschman (1958) emphasizing the linkages across sectors. In the standard
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vocabulary, there are externalities, and in assessing the success of industrial
policy in general and any project in particular, one has to take these into
account.
Moreover, good industrial policy incorporates risk taking, and risk taking
means that there will be successes and failures. No oil exploration company
would judge its performance by pointing out that it drilled some dry wells.
What matters is its overall success rate—whether the successes sufficiently
offset the failures. Too often, critics of industrial policy point to failures,
without weighing against such failures the successes. In the United States,
they point to the failure of American solar cell company Solyndra, without
noting that studies show the very high average return to public investments in
technology, which include, for instance, critical investments in the Internet.
Indeed, Mazzucato (2013) goes so far as to claim that in most of the major
advances, government has played a central role. Industrial policies (here,
meaning technology policies) have worked.
(3) Of course, if there are systematic, repeated failures, that points to a flaw
in institutional design, which needs to be corrected. A central theme of this
chapter is learning; that is, firms learn only by doing (e.g., the only way to
learn to produce steel, and to become better at producing steel is to produce
steel). However, the same point is true of institutions: the only way to learn
how to do industrial policies is to carry out industrial policies, to learn con-
sciously from one’s successes and failures. One of the reasons for the renewed
interest in industrial policies is that so many countries have successfully
carried out such policies. Countries rightly reason: if other countries, in
similar circumstances to us (at the time they carried out such policies) were
successful with such policies, why would we not be? East Asia carried out
industrial policies when their incomes were far lower than they are today,
and where their institutional development was much more limited.
Few economists argue that a country should not have a monetary policy or
a central bank simply because in the past its central bank mismanaged.
Rather, there is a broad consensus that countries can learn how to conduct
monetary policy in ways that promote growth and stability; and that there
are institutional arrangements that enhance the likelihood of success.
The same holds for industrial policies, and the analysis here suggest that
these policies may be as important for the long-term success of a development
strategy as any other.
(4) East Asia’s successful industrial policies were based on export-led growth.
However, the scope for export-led growth in the future may be more limited—
though there is still scope for African countries to avail themselves of this
model. East Asia’s success was based not only on exports—after all, Africa has
long exported commodities—but on the exports of manufactured goods. I will
explain later why there is a difference between exporting commodities and
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exporting manufactured goods: there are economy-wide benefits of learning
(including institutional development) associated with the latter that are not
typically associated with the former. However, global employment inmanufac-
turing is likely to decrease, as a result of improvements in productivity outstrip-
ping increases in demand. China now has a formidable comparative advantage
in awide range ofmanufacturing goods, but aswages in China rise, its compara-
tive advantage in basic manufacturing, requiring limited skills, is likely to
diminish. This will open the opportunity for some other developing countries,
at lower stages of development, to enter into manufacturing export-led growth.
This chapter first outlines the general argument for industrial policies,
broadening the set of market failures, which should be the objective of such
policies. It then focuses more narrowly on learning, which is so essential for
development, and how the government can promote it.
2.2 Towards a Broader Agenda for Industrial Policies
There are a large number of market failures that impeded development. The
underlying principle is simple: in perfectly functioning markets, private
returns to any action (any investment) equal social returns. However, the
conditions under which this is true are highly restrictive. Government policies
can both address the underlying market failures and the consequences.
2.2.1 Imperfect Risk and Capital Markets
Any investment in a new industry is risky, yet for reasons that are now well
understood, financial markets provide far from adequate insurance against
these risks. Industrial policies can help ‘socialize’ these risks, enabling projects
that otherwise would not be undertaken to be implemented. Similarly, entre-
preneurial firms need access to capital, but capital markets are notoriously
imperfect (Stiglitz andWeiss 1981). Many of the industrial policies of East Asia
were directed at correcting this market failure by providing access to funds at
commercial or near-commercial rates.
These two limitations are especially relevant to firms (and sectors) where
learning is important. Optimal social policy will entail producing beyond
the point where the value of the marginal product equals the marginal cost of
production; one needs to take into account the value of learning, and the
reduction in future costs as a result of increased production today. The implica-
tion of learning is that it may be desirable for a firm to produce so much that
its current profits are negative. However, if the firm is to do this, it has to find
the finance for the loss.With imperfect capital markets, it is likely that it cannot
do so.
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Moreover, the value of this learning is highly uncertain—there is uncer-
tainty both about the amount of learning (e.g., the magnitude of reduction in
future costs of production) and its value (which depends on future output).
Firms cannot insure themselves against these risks, so again, there is likely to
be underinvestment in learning.
2.2.2 Structural Transformation
An important part of development is structural transformation, moving from
an agrarian economy to an industrial economy. Markets do not make such
transformations on their own well (Delli Gatti et al. 2012a, 2012b). Those in
the declining sector often have low incomes, and the value of their assets
(including their human capital) has been diminished by the same forces
giving rise to the necessity for structural transformation. The imperfections
of risk and capital markets discussed in the previous paragraphs mean that
individuals who should move from the old to the new sectors of the economy
cannot get access to the resources needed to make the shift, and they have to
bear the inevitable risks associated with the transformation.
The result is that the economy canbe ‘stuck’, unable tomake a transformation
that would be beneficial to most citizens of the country. The shift from an
agrarian economy to an industrial economy is particularly difficult, because it
is typically associated with urbanization, which requires a large movement of
individualswith heavy investment in skills and housing.Withmore individuals
in theold sector(s) than is optimal, incomeswill be lower; and the lower incomes
will result in lower demands for goods in the non-traded industrial sector.
East Asia managed to break out of the resulting inefficient equilibrium by
focusing on exports. The demand for their exports was not limited by the low
incomes in their own country. This is one of the reasons that their model of
export-led growth was so successful; however, opportunities for manufactur-
ing export-led growth going forward are likely to be more limited. This means
that industrial policies will have to be focused on a broader range of industrial
policies, including promoting import substitution and the non-traded goods
sector.
Import substitution policies got a bad name, especially in Latin America,
because the industries that were created often only survived as the result of
protection. It was particularly costly when countries protected intermediate
goods, because that made goods farther down the production chain less
competitive. Countries often paid a high price for this kind of protectionism,
and the maintenance of this protection was often associated with corruption.
The protected industries generated rents, and, as always, the recipients of such
rents were willing to share some of the rents with the politicians who granted
the rents to them.
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It is not inevitable that industrial policies promoting import substitution
fail in this way. There are institutional safeguards that make it less likely. Even
the form of industrial policy affects the extent to which special interests
intrude in a distorting way.
2.2.3 Learning and Imperfect Appropriability
Market failures associated with learning received insufficient attention
in earlier literature, despite their importance. Learning is essential for devel-
opmental transformation. However, there are inevitably large spillovers asso-
ciated with learning—not only technological spillovers, but also institutional
spillovers. The development of institutions like financial institutions and
an education system that facilitate the functioning of the industrial sector
have important spillovers for the rest of the economy. Whenever there are
spillovers, private returns differ from social returns. These spillovers manifest
themselves in multiple ways in the development process. For instance, firms
that take the risk of trying out whether a particular product grows well in the
particular environment of the country will not be able to reap the full
benefits—if the project is successful, it will be imitated, if it fails, the firm
undertaking the experiment bears the losses (Hoff 1997).
Even banks may find it difficult to appropriate the full benefits of their
lending to a new entrepreneur. If the entrepreneur is successful, he will be
poached away by others; if he fails, the original lender will be forced to bear
the losses. This is one of the reasons that new businesses often find it difficult
to obtain funds, even if lending to them has strong social benefits (Emran and
Stiglitz 2009).
2.2.4 Macroeconomic Externalities
Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986) explained why markets with imperfect risk
markets and asymmetric information are not in general Pareto efficient. The
pervasiveness of market failures means that governments necessarily have to
focus their attention on the most important failures.
Among the most important failures are those that affect the macro economy.
Firms, on their own, may engage in too much borrowing, especially in foreign-
denominated debt. Banks, on their own, may engage in excessive risk taking.
The social cost of instability is enormous, and firms and banks, in their
own decision-making, do not fully take into account these social costs (see,
e.g., Stiglitz 2013). There are, for instance, long-term hysteresis effects, as
informational and organizational capital is destroyed as firms go bankrupt,
as educations are interrupted, and as young people, who otherwise would be
learning skills on the job, suffer unemployment and see their skills atrophy.
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Thus, industrial policies also need to be designed to reduce the magnitude,
structure, and consequences of the liabilities of corporations and banks, in an
attempt to reduce the magnitude of economic fluctuations and the frequency
of economic crises.
2.2.5 Inequality
Inequality should be a concern to any society. Stiglitz (2012, 2015), explains
why inequality is associated with better economic performance (higher
growth and more stability), and theoretical insights, which have been sup-
ported by empirical work at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (Berg and
Ostry 2011; Berg, Ostry, and Tsangarides 2014; OECD 2015). Markets, by
themselves, will pay no attention to their distributional impact. Thus, one of
the objectives of industrial policies should be pursuing greater equality. For
instance, policies that increase the demand for unskilled labour will reduce
inequality. Stiglitz (2015) outlines a broader set of instruments including
changes in legal frameworks, which would do so.
2.2.6 Climate Change
The objective of industrial policies is to address market failures. Some market
failures are more effectively addressed directly; but for a variety of reasons that
may prove difficult, in which case industrial policies may be an effective
second-best substitute.
Climate change is perhaps the most important market failure facing the
global economy. Charging a high enough carbon price would induce individ-
uals and firms to significantly reduce carbon emissions, but with few excep-
tions, it has proven difficult to induce countries to impose carbon pricing.
Instead, countries have been called upon to make commitments to reduce
carbon emissions. One way that developing countries can succeed in reducing
carbon emissions is industrial policies that encourage renewable energy, and
discourage carbon-intensive industries and technologies.
2.3 Creating a Learning Society
In this and Section 2.4, we hone in on industrial policies associated with
learning. As we noted, successful and sustained growth requires creating a
learning society. This is especially so in the twenty-first century, as wemove to
a knowledge economy.
The transformation to ‘learning societies’ that occurred around 1800 for
Western economies, and more recently for those in Asia, has had a far greater
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impact on human well-being than improvements in allocative efficiency or
resource accumulation (Solow 1957; Stiglitz and Greenwald 2014a, 2014b).
This implies that our focus should be on the impact of policies on techno-
logical change, and how it is brought about by learning, as well as research and
development (R&D). In the case of developing countries, the focus should be
on the diffusion of knowledge from developed to developing country and the
diffusion of knowledge within the country. As the 1998 World Development
Report (World Bank 1999) emphasized, what separates developing from devel-
oped countries is as much a gap in knowledge as a gap in resources. However,
even in developed countries, there are large gaps between the productivity of
the best firms and others.2
Markets, on their own, are not efficient in promoting innovation and
learning (Arrow 1962a, 1962b; Stiglitz 1987; Stiglitz and Greenwald 2014a,
2014b). Because markets on their own will not do a good job in creating a
learning society, there need to be systematic interventions by the govern-
ment. The policies that do this are markedly different from those traditionally
advocated by economists, which focus on improving the static efficiency of
resource allocation and the accumulation of capital—including policies that
constituted the Washington Consensus.
Indeed, from the perspective of creating a learning society, those policies
may be counterproductive.
This analysis implies that a central question of growth and development
should be:What should governments do to promote growth through learning
(technological progress and innovation)?
Creating a learning society entails looking comprehensively at all the factors
affecting learning: the education system; what has been called the economy’s
innovation system, which includes the intellectual property rights (IPR)
regime and technology policy; macroeconomic policies, including exchange
rate policy; investment policies, and industrial and trade policies. Underlying
questions include: How does learning occur? How dowe learn to learn? I argue
that special attention should be placed on learning by doing, and, by analogy,
learning to learn by learning.
We need to look at all policies and institutions through the lens of learning,
asking: (a) how they affect capabilities of learning; (b) how they affect incen-
tives to learn (motivate learning); (c) how they facilitate learning and catalyze
it, including how they help create mindsets that are conducive to learning—
mindsets such as those associated with the Enlightenment; and (d) how they
impose impediments to learning.
2 The existence and persistence of such gaps undermines the concept of an aggregate production
function. This has fundamental implications for the way many economists, especially within
macroeconomics, approach development.
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2.4 Industrial and Trade Policies
In this section, we focus on the various instruments that government can use
to promote a learning society, suggesting that there are many more ‘instru-
ments’ for industrial policy than has usually thought to be the case, and
explaining how some of the standard policy advice was counterproductive
to creating a learning society.
Standard trade theories focus on comparative advantage—on the country’s
current relative strengths. Korea’s comparative advantage in the period
after the KoreanWar was in rice, and it was advised to strip away trade barriers;
such policies would have resulted in its focusing on rice. There is a one-time
gain from liberalization, from stripping away trade barriers and opening
up markets.
Our theories, focusing on learning, provide a different perspective.We focus
on the diffusion of technology from developed to less developed countries, on
spillovers from one sector to another, and on learning within any sector.
A closer examination of learning (including learning by doing and learning
to learn) shows that much of it is what Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) called
localized learning—localized to particular technologies, but not necessarily
to particular sectors. Similar technologies can be used across sectors. Many
processes, practices, and institutions entail cross-sector learning and have
potentially strongpositive effects onproductivity. Examples include inventory
control processes (like just-in-timeproduction), labourmanagementprocesses,
and computerization. Similarly, institutions (such as those providing financial
services) that develop to serve one sector may prove useful in others.
Markets will under-invest in (or under-produce in) learning sectors, espe-
cially those with large learning spillovers to others, and even more so when
there are imperfections in capital markets, or when learning is especially risky
(because of the market failures referred to earlier, imperfect insurance and
capital markets).
This helps explain the important role of government in promoting innov-
ation and learning (e.g., in the Internet, biotech, or even agriculture in the
nineteenth century). And it is especially important when the research projects
require large investments (such as the human genome project or the Internet)
and in basic research.
For developing countries, Greenwald and I (Greenwald and Stiglitz 2006;
Stiglitz and Greenwald 2014a, 2014b) have put forward the ‘infant economy’
argument for protection. We explain why the industrial sector has greater
learning spillovers than the agricultural sector, and therefore why it is desir-
able to encourage the industrial sector. Central then to growth and develop-
ment is understanding the structure of learning within an economy—
including within and across sectors.
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The infant economy argument for protection is distinctly different from the
infant industry argument. The latter is predicated on imperfections in capital
markets. In the infant economy argument, externalities and spillovers,
technological and institutional, are crucial.
In a learning economy, we focus on dynamic comparative advantage—
recognizing that comparative advantage is endogenous. With learning by
doing, a country’s comparative advantage is affected by what a country
produces.
We have focused on ‘learning’, but even more important is ‘learning to
learn’. Industrial and trade policy can enhance an economy’s learning
capacities. This, of course, introduces complex strategic questions.
2.4.1 Multiple Instruments
Traditionally, governments have employed multiple instruments, including
subsidies and trade interventions. Trade restrictions have a short-run cost.
However, if those ‘distortions’ lead the economy to produce more of the
good with higher learning and learning spillovers, then productivity in future
years will be higher. There is a long-run benefit offsetting these short-run
costs. Under quite general conditions, it can be shown that it is optimal to
impose trade restrictions or to intervene in the market in other ways to
promote these sectors.
Unfortunately, the World Trade Organization (WTO) has restricted the set
of instruments that developing countries can employ, for example, they may
not be able to provide direct subsidies or trade interventions.
Exchange rate policy is an effective, low-cost instrument with some political
economy advantages. Because it is broad-based, it is less subject to capture.
Markets will undersupply research, especially basic research. R&D is even
more important in developing countries, for instance, for adapting existing
technologies to circumstances of their country, for facilitating the transfer of
knowledge (which itself is an important part of the learning process for devel-
oping countries), and for leapfrogging. Some countries (such as Brazil) have
shown that even indeveloping countries, industrial policies canpromoteR&D,
and that even leapfrogging is possible.
2.4.2 Political Economy
There is a standard objection to industrial policies based on political economy.
The argument holds that with an ideal government, intervention might
improve matters, but real-world interventions do not. It is worth observing
that such political economy objections are based on political analysis, not
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economic analysis, and the political analysis is often as or more simplistic
than the simplistic economic analysis, which we have already criticized.
In fact, almost every successful country has had industrial policies. In the
United States in the nineteenth century, the government supported major
advances in telecommunications (the telegraph) and agriculture (then the
dominant sector of the economy). Of course, the private sector has played a
central role in bringing innovation to the market.
Successful countries learned how to manage the political economy prob-
lems, through a variety of institutional arrangements, for example, requiring
those receiving support to put in funding of their own, peer review systems,
sunset clauses, and so on. Broad-based export subsidies and support as in East
Asia (including through exchange rate policies and broad-based educational
and infrastructure policies) may be a desirable way of promoting the industrial
sector, partly because they may be relatively immune from special interest
influence.
The infant economy argument in particular has been criticized on
the grounds that government cannot pick winners. The point of industrial
policies is not to pick winners, but to identify externalities and other market
failures.3
There is, however, an important lesson to be learned from the failures of
industrial policies in the past. The design of industrial policy has to reflect
capacities and capabilities of government; governments have to constantly
assess how well their industrial policies are working, and whether they are
being ‘captured’ by special interests; and they have to strive constantly to
implement industrial policies more effectively.
2.4.3 Intellectual Property Rights
When one thinks about creating a learning society, one naturally thinks about
IPR. Advocates of IPR often seem to argue that they are at the centre of creating
a learning and innovative economy. However, as I (and others) have argued,
they are but a small part of a country’s innovation system, which includes
government-funded research and a country’s education system.
There are significant static costs of intellectual property. It impedes the use
of information and gives rise to monopoly power. Increasingly, the alleged
dynamic benefits have come to be questioned. IPR, especially if poorly
designed, can impede innovation and learning. Knowledge is the most
important ingredient to production of knowledge, and IPR reduces access to
knowledge.Moreover, the patent system intervenes with the open system that
3 There are, of course, other objections to industrial policies, which are dealt with more
extensively elsewhere, e.g., in Greenwald and Stiglitz (2014a, 2014b).
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is essential for the advancement of science. In addition, the patent thicket and
patent trolls have provided further impediments to research. The patent
system even distorts the pattern of research, encouraging more research dir-
ected at extending market power.
These adverse effects are especially significant for developing countries.
Successful development entails closing the knowledge gap and necessitating
access to knowledge.4 It is even more important in areas of health—access to
life-saving medicines has implications that go beyond the budget.
2.5 Economic Diversification: An Application of Policies
Aimed at Changing the Structure of Production
Many regions of the world (notably in Africa and Latin America) are still
highly dependent on commodities, making them highly vulnerable to
changes in commodity prices. However, a healthy economic structure should
not be so dependent on external factors, especially given the high volatility of
export markets and prices.
Because the production of these natural resources does not incorporate
much skilled labour, it does not incentivize citizens to invest in human capital.
Because mining is sufficiently different from other production processes, there
are only limited learning spillovers. Commodities production provides a weak
basis for creating a learning economy and society.
Many countries failed to implement reforms that might create a more diver-
sified structure of production. Indeed, among the African countries, only a few
have made much progress in creating an economy with even limited diversifi-
cation. Today, one of the main objectives of industrial policies should be to
diversify the structure of production.
Approaches that were the rule in the 1980s and 1990s that relied on the
market clearly did not work (Noman and Stiglitz 2015). We now have a better
theoretical and empirical understanding of these failures. What is required is a
portfolio of instruments. Perhaps the most important macro instrument is
competitive and stable real exchange rate policies. However, these must be
accompanied by industrial policies, public investments, and monetary pol-
icies that do not stifle the real sector.
4 This explains the call for a ‘developmentally oriented’ intellectual property regime. The
intellectual property regime that is appropriate for a developing country is markedly different
from that appropriate for an advanced country. The agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) tried to achieve excessive harmonization: the TRIPS regime
of WTO is not developmentally oriented. Even so, it is important for developing countries and
emerging markets to make full use of the latitude given by TRIPS; most have failed to do so.
Coordination and Industrial Policy
34
Long-term strategies placing technological change and learning at the
centre need to ensure macro consistency (full employment and current and
capital account balances), which requires a balanced strategy that includes
some traditional activities that generate revenues in foreign currency, and
others to ensure full employment of the less skilled population.
The state will have to fulfil other roles. Education policies need to ensure
that there are no bottlenecks in the supply of well-trained workers. There is
need for infrastructure investments, in highways, ports, and airports. Public–
private partnerships may be able to play some role in providing infrastructure,
but we have learned from the past that such partnerships often fail, with the
government bearing the losses and the private sector taking the gains.5
Even an economy based on natural resources can use those resources as
a basis of diversification, as South Africa demonstrated as it moved from
earth-moving equipment into automobiles. There are backward, forward,
and horizontal linkages that can be exploited (Jourdan 2014). Export taxes
and restrictions on natural resources that have not had value-added compo-
nents may be an important part of the appropriate industrial policies.
Trade in manufactured goods and in services will be important as these
formerly natural resource-dependent economies attempt to diversify. The
right strategy is, however, more than simply increasing exports and strength-
ening import competing industries. Strengthening the non-traded sector
is necessary, and this, as in the traded-goods sector, requires supply-side
measures (e.g., constructing the appropriate infrastructure, providing the
appropriate skills through the education system, and ensuring that the finan-
cial system is capable of providing finance for small and medium-sized
enterprises). But demand-side policies are also necessary: poverty reduction
and a larger middle class will increase the size of domestic markets.
2.6 Industrial Policies: Broader Objectives and More Instruments
This chapter has set out to argue thatwe needmore expansive industrial policies
with broader objectives and more instruments. Industrial policies should
be concerned not only with growth, especially through creating a learning
society, but also with mitigating inequality and carbon emissions. We have
also explained that there is a much wider range of instruments, which is the
flip side of the observation made at the beginning of this chapter that all
governments, whether they know it or not, are engaged in industrial policy.
5 Part of the problem is an asymmetry in rights and responsibilities: with limited liability, firms
can always evade contractual obligations, simply by going into default; and the threat of doing so
provides the basis for contract renegotiation. Governments, however, are long-lived, and especially
when the country has signed an investment treaty, may be sued for the loss of expected profits.
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The rules, institutional and legal frameworks, and policies governing our
economy and our society affect the structure of our economy, including the
industrial structure and the choice of technology. The choice of one infra-
structure over another favours one industry over another; the design of the
educational system provides a supply of labour with various skills, which
affects the profitability of different industries; and bankruptcy laws may be
more favourable to one industry (such as the financial sector) relative to
others. If a government decides not to have, or not to enforce, strong compe-
tition laws, it favours monopolies and oligopolies, at the expense of the
sectors, which use the output of those sectors as inputs.
2.6.1 Macroeconomics as an Industrial Policy
Exchange rate policy has traditionally been thought of as a macroeconomic
policy but it is also an industrial policy and that is true too of other aspects of
macroeconomic policy. Economies that rely on monetary policy for macro-
economic stabilization are, simultaneously, affecting the economies’ sectoral
allocations, for example, relative to what they would be if the government
relied more on fiscal policy. Monetary policy entails varying interest rates in
response to economic conditions, putting the burden of adjustment on inter-
est-sensitive sectors. These sectoral effects are ignored in the overly simplistic
models typically employed by macro-economists, but they can be of first-
order importance, especially in the developmental process. If, for instance,
the interest-sensitive sectors include manufacturing, in which learning poten-
tials are particularly significant, then reliance on interest rates for macroeco-
nomic adjustment can have an adverse developmental effect.
The extent to which governments pursue macro-stability is itself an indus-
trial policy and one that is especially important for creating a learning society.
Stability is important to learning, for a number of reasons. Much of our
knowledge resides within institutions and within organizations, like firms.
Recessions destroy firms and the embedded knowledge that they contain.
There is, in effect, negative learning. Moreover, recessions impede learning,
as attention is focused on survival. In addition, recessions impede one of
the most important aspects of human capital accumulation—on-the-job
learning—with long-term consequences for growth and standards of living.
Deep downturns lower a country’s potential growth rate, not only the level of
future income; there are significant hysteresis effects associated with reces-
sions, helping to explain why effects of downturns persist.
This analysis has strong policy implications: there are significant long-term
consequences of not having strong counter-cyclical policies. A focus on gov-
ernment debt can be short-sighted and counterproductive, since it can give
rise to far more important adverse effects on real wealth accumulation.
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2.7 Towards a Developmental State
Few economies have made the transition from a less developed economy to a
more advanced economy relying simply on market forces. Successful econ-
omies have realized that market failures are pervasive in all economies, and
especially in developing countries. Even in developed countries, whenever
one talks about innovation, learning, and structural transformation, one is in
a world in which there is a presumption that markets are not efficient and that
well-designed economic policies, including industrial policies, can improve
economic performance.6
Successful countries have employed a portfolio of instruments, of interven-
tions, in the market economy. The variety of approaches suggests that there is
no one way; but the multiplicity of failures suggests that there are also many
ways to fail. The difficulty of achieving a successful developmental transform-
ation suggests that countries should not necessarily seek the optimal set of
policies (whatever they might mean or entail), but rather, a politically accept-
able strategy, involving a portfolio of instruments, which has a reasonable
chance of success. These choices should be based on learning from the success
and failures of others. One of the most important lessons to be learned,
however, from those countries that have been successful is that they have
learned how to conduct industrial policies as they have gone along—there has
been institutional learning.
Industrial policies that work at one stage of development and in one envir-
onment do not work in another. The mere fact that an industrial policy has
been successful may necessitate a change in that policy, because the circum-
stances of the country have changed. The world today is different than it was
at the time when East Asian countries embarked on their transformation. One
cannot simply follow what worked well for other countries in the past.
Thus, this chapter has not attempted to set forth a single set of prescriptions—
it is not a handbook from which those seeking to pursue industrial policies
can look up a set of policies appropriate to their circumstances. Rather, it is
a set of principles, which I hope will guide countries as they attempt to forge
a set of policies that will lead to a successful developmental transformation.
6 As we have emphasized, credit/revenue constraints are likely to be particularly important,
there is likely to be imperfect competition (sometimes because of increasing returns to scale and
scope), and risks will be large, but risk markets will be absent. All of these were elements of standard
Schumpeterian economics, and should be at the centre of endogenous growth theory and growth
policy. Unfortunately, policies are often based on simplistic models, consistent with simplistic
ideologies, and used by special interests to advance particular policy agenda. Schumpeter’s (1942)
own ideas in this area were misguided: even though he recognized that markets would be
dominated by a single firm, he thought competition for the market—Schumpeterian
competition—would suffice to ensure efficiency. He was wrong, as experience and theory over
the subsequent half-century showed (Greenwald and Stiglitz 2014a, 2014b; Stiglitz and Greenwald
2014a, 2014b).
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